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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) CaseNo.20050323-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a plea of guilty and a denial of a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea in the Second District Court of Weber County. The 
Defendant was sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of five years to 
life at the Utah State Prison. The sentence was ordered to run consecutive to a 
sentence that the Defendant was on parole for when the current offense was 
committed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the pour-over provision in 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT APPOINTING NEW COUNSEL AND 
GRANTING HIM A HEARING? 
Standard of Review: This should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard of review. "We review a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. 
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved when 
Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. (R. 032-33). 
II. DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY DIDN'T ASK FOR 
CONFLICT COUNSEL TO BE APPOINTED AND WHEN HE 
DIDN'T PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT ON 
DEFENDANT'S BEHALF? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court must determine as a matter of 
fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
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This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court, but nonetheless is allowed 
on appeal. See, State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(Stating that 
a trial court may address an issue for the first time on appeal if there was plain 
error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective assistance of counsel). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course 
of committing a robbery* if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
§ 76-10-503(2)(a) Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and 
ownership of dangerous weapons by certain persons 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, 
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under 
his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony 
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77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in 
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified 
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
78-2a-3(2)(j) Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
Rule 12 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion 
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the 
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by 
affidavit or evidence. 
RULE 11 PLEAS: 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open 
court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant 
has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead 
in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a 
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defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith 
be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a 
preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall 
advise the defendant, or counsel, of the 
requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty 
and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right 
to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront 
and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right 
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient 
if it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and 
if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is 
limited. 
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These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the 
court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot 
understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the 
statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea, 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
Constitution of the United States 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Aggravated Robbery, 
in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-302 and Possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-503(2)(a). (R. 001). As part of a plea 
bargain the Defendant pled guilty to Aggravated Robbery on January 27, 2005. 
The possession of a firearm charge was dismissed with the agreement that the 
State would not refer the charge to the federal government. (R. 023). The 
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Defendant signed a statement in support of his guilty plea. (R. 026-031). The 
trial court engaged in a Rule 11 colloquy where Defendant was questioned 
about his constitutional rights and whether his plea was voluntary. Defendant 
indicated that his plea was of his own free choice and that he understood his 
rights. (R. 060/3-6). 
Defendant was informed by the trial court that he had up until the time 
of sentencing to make a motion to have his plea withdrawn. (R. 060/8). 
Sentencing was scheduled for March 17, 2005. (R. 060/8). 
On February 15, 2005, the court received a letter from the Defendant. In 
the letter he informed the court that he had consulted with a contract lawyer at 
the prison and had talked to other people, and he no longer believed that he 
should have pled guilty to a first degree felony. He also informed the court that 
the only reason he pled guilty was because his attorney told him that if the jury 
found him guilty he would have to serve the five to life and then a one to 
fifteen. Although he doesn't use the word "consecutive", it is clear that this 
was his understanding. The Defendant also informed the court that he didn't 
feel like his attorney performed to the best of his abilities, and the Defendant 
felt rushed through the matter. For those reasons, he requested that his plea be 
withdrawn. 
On March 9, 2005, Defendant's attorney filed a motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea. The motion stated that it was filed pursuant to U.C.A. §77-13-6 
and that it was based upon a memorandum that would be submitted. (R. 033). 
A memorandum was not submitted. 
On March 11, 2005, the State submitted a response to the Defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea. (R. 035-39). Defendant was sentenced on March 
17, 2005. Before the trial court sentenced the Defendant, it pointed out that a 
motion to withdraw the plea had been received. The trial court asked 
Defendant's attorney what the status of the motion was. His attorney answered 
that the Defendant still wanted to withdraw his plea. The Court then asked 
Defendant's attorney if he wanted to make any further argument other than 
what had been submitted. Defendant's attorney answered, "I don't." The 
Court then denied Defendant's motion. In doing so, the Court found that there 
were not grounds that were sufficient for him to grant the motion. (R. 059/2-
3). The Defendant was sentenced to five years to life at the Utah State Prison. 
That sentence was to run consecutive to a sentence that Defendant was on 
parole for when the current offense was committed. (R. 059/3-4). 
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on March 23, 
2005. (R. 043-44). A timely notice of appeal was filed on April 7, 2005. (R. 
046). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with Aggravated Robbery, and possession 
of a firearm by a restricted person. The allegations against the Defendant were 
that he and the victim rode together to the mouth of Ogden Canyon to look for 
a lost ring. The Defendant pulled out a gun and demanded the victim's 
valuables. He then took the victim's car keys, wallet and other property. The 
victim reached up to grab the gun. A struggle ensued and the gun discharged, 
striking the victim in the left forearm. The Defendant ran from the scene and 
took the victim's car. When he was apprehended a short time later he was in 
possession of the victim's wallet. The gun was found in the garbage can at a 
nearby residence. (R. 060/6-7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion when it the court did not grant the 
Defendant a hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea. The Defendant 
alleged that his trial counsel had essentially been ineffective and that he felt 
rushed when he took the plea. When a defendant attacks a guilty plea he is 
entitled to a hearing. See, Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 341 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The trial court is required to assess the credibility of the evidence and 
make sufficiently detailed findings of fact. See, State v. Humphrey; 79 P.3d 
960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
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In the case at bar, Defendant was not given a hearing and therefore the 
court was not able to assess the credibility of his evidence or enter detailed 
findings of fact. Furthermore, Defendant was not appointed a "conflict-free" 
attorney to assist him with his motion to withdraw. The same attorney who he 
complained about filed the motion, but then failed to file a memorandum in 
support thereof and failed to present any evidence or make any arguments on 
Defendant's behalf. Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and 
his case should be remanded to the trial court and Defendant should be granted 
a hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT APPOINTING NEW COUNSEL AND 
WITHOUT GRANTING HIM A HEARING 
In Utah, a plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court." U.C.A. §77-13-6 (2003). In State v. 
Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court held that 
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was not 
dispositive in determining a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. "A defendant 
can show good cause by putting forth evidence that the plea was in fact 
involuntary." State v. Humphrey, 79 P.3d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
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Once a Defendant presents evidence that the plea was involuntary, "the court 
needs to assess the credibility of the evidence and make detailed findings on all 
relevant facts.'5 Id. Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires the trial court to state its findings on the record when factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion. These findings must be sufficiently detailed 
to allow this Court the opportunity to adequately review the decision. See, 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the case at bar, the Defendant filed his own motion to withdraw the 
plea. In it he stated several reasons why he wanted to withdraw the plea. The 
first was because his lawyer said that if he was convicted he would have to 
serve the five to life and then the one to fifteen. He also believed that his 
attorney had not performed to the best of his ability and that he was rushed 
through the matter. (R. 032). 
Defendant's attorney filed an official motion to withdraw. In this 
motion, the part about the consecutive sentences was left out. The motion 
stated that the grounds for withdrawal were that his attorney did not perform to 
the best of his abilities and that the Defendant felt he was rushed. (R. 033). 
The same attorney who entered the plea and who was being complained about 
filed the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and stood with Defendant at his 
sentencing. 
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When the Defendant appeared for sentencing, the trial court did not hold 
a hearing on the matter. The trial court was informed that the Defendant still 
wished to withdraw his plea. The trial court didn't appoint new counsel to 
determine if the prior counsel had been effective and the court didn't take 
evidence to find out if there was good cause or if the plea was involuntarily 
entered. Instead the court asked for arguments. When the attorneys declined, 
the Court stated: 
[b]ased upon the submissions that I have, the Court has looked at 
the process by which this was brought by before the Court, Mr. 
Person. It is not sufficient to claim that your attorney did not 
perform to the best of his abilities and you felt rushed. You and I 
had a discussion about this case, I went through what your rights 
were in great detail and we talked about that over and over talked 
about it. And in addition to that, there were things placed in 
writing and I find that there are no grounds sufficient for me to 
grant the motion, and therefore, I deny the motion to set aside your 
plea. (R. 059/2-3). 
In Humphrey, the defendant plead guilty and then filed a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. A hearing was held and the defendant argued 
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He testified about his 
mental state on the morning he entered the plea and he presented 
correspondence from a social worker who had counseled him. State v. 
Humphrey, 79 P.3d at 961. The trial court denied the defendant's motion 
to withdraw the plea. This court stated that "the record is unclear as to 
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whether the court made the necessary credibility assessment and factual 
determinations based on the evidence." Id. at 962 
At the conclusion of the evidence the court stated, "my observations of 
the defendant at the time was that he understood what he was doing; that he 
didn't appear to me to be under any more duress . . . . I'm going to deny the 
motion because I believe that [it] hasn't met the objective standard and I 
believe that anything that has been done here as the evidence today doesn't rise 
to a level that would make me . . . both according to law [and] good 
conscience, you know, grant the motion to withdraw the guilty plea." Id. 
(brackets in original) 
This Court remanded the case so the trial court could make the necessary 
factual findings to support its ruling. This Court found three reasons why the 
trial court was in error. (1) The trial court had applied an objective standard. 
(2) The trial court was uncertain as to whether it could consider the new 
evidence and instead relied solely on observations at the plea colloquy. (3) 
Most importantly, the trial court did not enter any detailed factual findings 
concerning the evidence the defendant presented at the hearing on his motion 
to withdraw the plea. Id. 
In the case at bar, the trial court could not enter any detailed factual 
findings because the court didn't allow the Defendant a hearing and an 
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opportunity to present his evidence. In Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In it 
he expressed dissatisfaction with the plea and with his attorney. The court 
discharged his attorney and appointed a new attorney to advise him on his 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Id at 342. The court denied his motion 
and sentenced him to prison. He eventually filed a motion for writ of habeas 
corpus. This Court addressed the method by which to attack a guilty plea. Of 
importance to this appeal is the following language found in the conclusion. 
As we read the pertinent cases with an eye to harmonizing them, 
challenge may be made to a guilty plea either directly or 
collaterally. If it is made directly, it must be in the context of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which can be 
appealed. If it is made collaterally, no prior motion to withdraw is 
required. In either scenario, an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily 
be held unless the record of a prior hearing show petitioner is 
clearly not entitled to relief. 
Id. at 344-45. Defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine if there was 
any merit to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He is also entitled to 
sufficient findings of fact to determine whether there was good cause to 
withdraw the plea. This case is similar to Humphrey, in that the trial court 
relied on the observations at the plea colloquy and didn't consider new 
evidence. The Court also failed to enter detailed factual findings as to the 
evidence the Defendant presented because no evidence was presented. It is 
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impossible for this Court to determine if Defendant was rushed or if the plea 
was voluntarily entered. For these reasons, this case should be remanded to the 
trial court and Defendant should be appointed new counsel and a hearing 
should be held to determine whether there is a basis to withdraw the 
Defendant's plea. 
II. THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY DIDN'T ASK FOR CONFLICT 
COUNSEL TO BE APPOINTED AND WHEN HE DIDN'T 
PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT ON DEFENDANT'S 
BEHALF. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
In the case at bar, Defendant sent a letter to the court requesting that his 
plea be withdrawn. Shortly thereafter, Defendant's trial attorney filed a motion 
to withdraw the plea, but left out the part about Defendant being told that his 
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charges (which were part of a single criminal episode) would run consecutive if 
he was convicted by a jury. The motion indicated that a memorandum in 
support of the motion would be submitted. (R. 033). This memorandum was 
never submitted. The State then filed a five page objection to the motion 
where it cited numerous cases in support of its position. (R. 035-40). 
Defendant's attorney didn't respond with any legal argument or authority. At 
Defendant's sentencing Defendant's attorney informed the court that 
Defendant wanted to withdraw his plea. When the trial court asked if counsel 
wanted to make any argument, Defendant's attorney answered, "I don't." (R. 
059/2). 
In State v. Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this 
Court stated that "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential and recognize the importance of sound trial strategy." In 
Strickland, the Supreme Court held that the appellant must "identify the acts or 
omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable 
professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all 
the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range 
of professionally competent assistance." Strickland, U.S. at 690. 
There is no sound trial strategy involved when an attorney indicates that 
a memorandum of points and authorities will be filed but then isn't. There is 
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also no strategy that would cause an attorney to not request an evidentiary 
hearing or to make any arguments on a client's behalf. Since the first prong of 
the Strickland test has been met it is necessary to move to the second prong of 
the test. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 
2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary 
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second 
part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 
187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making 
the determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should 
"consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as 
17 
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect 
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence 
in the result. Furthermore, when part of the basis for withdrawing the plea was 
his attorney's ineffectiveness, a new attorney should have been appointed to 
explore any ineffective claims. "The right to conflict-free representation is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382,387 (Utah 
1999). 
When an ineffectiveness claim "is grounded on a conflict of interest, we 
presume prejudice if the defendant demonstrates 'that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" State v. Brandley, 972 
P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(quoting, State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 
(Utah 1997). A defendant can establish an "actual conflict of interest" if he 
can show that trial counsel "was required to make a choice advancing his own 
interests to the detriment of his client's interests." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d at 
686. 
In the case at bar, there was an actual conflict because Defendant's 
allegations were that his trial counsel had in effect been ineffective. This 
forced Defendant's attorney to make a choice between his own interests and 
18 
those of his client. It would have been contrary to the attorney's own interests 
to appear in court and inform the court that he had been ineffective. For these 
reasons a "conflict-free" attorney should have been appointed to assist the 
Defendant on his motion to withdraw the plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea so the court could make adequate findings of fact to determine if the plea 
was voluntarily entered. Defendant also received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his attorney didn't file a memorandum, didn't excuse himself 
from the case, didn't present any evidence and didn't make an argument on 
Defendant's behalf. For these reasons, the case should be remanded to the trial 
court for a hearing on the motion and the Defendant should be appointed a new 
attorney. 
DATED this ?_ day of September 200. 
DEE W. SMITI 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, AttoraeyTbr the Plafntifr>J60 East 300 
South, 6th Floo^ P.O. Box 140854, Salt La£e City! Utal 
prepaid this j _ day of September 2005. 
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ROY D.COLE (#8515) 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., 
OF WEBER COUNTY 
Attorneys for Bryan Person 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT MR - 92005 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYAN PERSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 041905772 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, by and through his Attorney, Roy D. Cole, and hereby moves this Court for an order 
allowing him to withdraw his plea of Guilty to the charge of in the above entitled matter. The defendant feels that his 
attorney did not perfonn to the best of his abilities and that the defendant feels that he was rushed through the whole 
matter. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 and is based upon Defendant's Memorandum 
to be submitted. 
So MOVED this 8 day of March, of 2005. 
,0 
..- ROY D C O L E / 
ATTORNEY Ft>R DEFENDANT 
° 2 3 
STATE OF UTAH VS BRYAN PERSON 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No 041905772 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Foregoing, MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY, 
via County Mail, Postage Prepaid this 8 day of March, of 2005, to: 
MARK R. DECARIA 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
CMC 4145 
/ 
ACKI 
SECRETARY 
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ADDENDUM B 
MARK R. DECARIA, NO. 0850 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
BRANDON J. MAYNARD, 8561 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., STE 230 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-399-8377 
Fax: 801-399-8304 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON, DOB: 09/23/1981 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
CASE NO. CH\S0^17X 
Judge VN\^ > 
OTN#:UTl 4657365 
The undersigned BRANDON J. MAYNARD, DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant, in Weber County, State of Utah, committed the following 
crime(s): 
COUNT 1: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302, as follows: That BRYAN ALLEN PERSON on or about 10/13/2004, (a) unlawfully and 
intentionally took or attempted to take personal property in the possession of Travis Mendosa from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; and 
(a) used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon; 
(b) caused serious bodily injury upon another; and/or 
(c) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle. 
COUNT 2: PUROmSETTRANSFER, POSSESSION OR USE OF A FIREARM DY RESTRICTED 
PERSON, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a), as follows: That 
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON on or about 10/13/2004, did intentionally or knowingly agree, consent, offer, 
or arrange to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under his custody or control, or did intentionally or 
knowingly purchase, transfer, possess, use. or have under his or her custody or control any firearm and: 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony. 
. . . . . . . -OUo^-" " 
v-n 
itf «.. prX \C, P 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es): 
W GOLDSBERRY,WCSO 
DATED this I& day of October, 2004 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
BRANDON J. MAYNARB 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Subscribed in my presence this day of October, 2004 
Magistrate 
Presented and filed this ^b day of October. 2004 
AZUIS \f.CV? 
Clerk 
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ADDENDUM C 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Case No: 041905772 FS 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Date: January 27, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbiel 
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE 
Prosecutor: BRANDEN MILES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 23, 1981 
CAT/CIC 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/27/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present in 
custody with Utah State Prison and is represented by Roy Cole. 
Laurie Shingle, court reporter, is present for the record. 
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a full Rule 11 
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court. 
Defendant enters a plea of guilty to count 1, Aggravated Robbery, 
a first degree felony. Trial date is stricken. Pre-sentence is 
requested. State agrees to not refer this charge federally. 
State makes a motion to dismiss count 2. Court grants the motion. 
Page 1 
O r\ 
Case No: 041905772 
Date: Jan 27, 2 00 5 
APP SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/17/2005 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Page 2 (last) 0?4 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
fv */f. ,- f y 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 6li(C(i i>~ i'f'Z. 
Defendant. 
Judge T ' ^ L ' Cx. } -v 
I , 7 v y < * , ^ f- ' •• J t ' . _, hereby acknowledge and certify that Thave been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights; 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes. 
CRIME & STATUTORY DEGREE 
PROVISION 
A. 
B. 
C 
D. 
PUNISHMENT 
MIN/MAX AND/OR 
MINIMUM MANDATORY 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty (or no contest) 
' •?8 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
n^fjc llA(., .:. 
V , . , v - '. | - i \ . ' • / 
*/,/,. :..t , .-'/ •/-
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..( .'.. / _• ...i( / u-A , . v.- , 
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y / / • • — * - < 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes.) I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do no dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no 
contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
COUNSEL: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot aiford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I 
might later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I 
have done^o knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
•v?7 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
'/ ""> T") / ' / • - , . 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is f c-./ ( / (
 t» ((- ^ ( {> f\ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and tfab consequence^ of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
JURY TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an Impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) by attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity 
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs. 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. I know that if I 
were to have a jury trial. I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no on could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I 
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and 
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, 
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
028 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
POTEIVTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a 
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime 
that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or 
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense 
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)(is/are not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
"P^-. l Ac 
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TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not binding 
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge 
may do are not binding on the Judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am I '? years of age. I have attended school through the /L Grade. I can read and 
understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I will be allowed to 
withdraw my plea only if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 
sentencing for any reason. 
DATED this / A day of- J '<-»•- .<-<-« j 200jf? 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSEATTORNEY 
i ) 
f >' ' 
I certify that I am the attorney for v • -V / c i -f f ^4 -1> 3 <• J — , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents 
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of, my knowledge and belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and 
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurafejnd true.. 
/' 
/ / 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
BARN6 '-' 
030 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
->> I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against ^ J j ^ 
/ icertiryuiaxi ^ ^ i have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that 
± ^ ^ f ± ^ ^ n ^ s criminal conduct which constitutes the offenses) is true and 
the tactual oasis oi UK coercion to encourage a plea has been offered 
correct. No improper inducements, threats^^r coercio S ^ ^ ^ ^ 
defendant. The plea ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S t S c o i There is reasonable cause to 
Agreement or as supplemented on the recorbetor
 for o f f e n s e ( s ) for w h i c h 
PROSECL 
BARNO. 
UTING ATTORNEY 
ORDER 
Based „
 te to - f o * in ^ ^ S ^ S ^ S ^ . *= 
voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) 
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
DATED this si,'? day of 
c 
ADDENDUM E 
BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN # 9777 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801)-399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYAN PERSON, 
Defendant 
Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 to withdraw his 
plea of guilty to Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. Defendant moves to withdraw his 
plea because he "feels" he was "rushed" and that his attorney "did not perform to the best of his 
abilities." Defendant's reasons amount to nothing more than a change of mind and he is not 
entitled to withdraw his plea for the reasons below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION BECAUSE HE 
ENTERED THE GUILTY PLEA KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY. 
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (2004). 
The defendant asks the court for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty because he now "feels" he 
was rushed and that his attorney did not "perform to the best of his abilities." Defendant does not 
allege that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly or involuntarily; therefore, this Court should 
f-< : T . ' ! ' ' 
iuuJ i.. • • i 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW PLEA 
Case No. 041905772 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
.°Z5 
should deny his motion to withdraw his plea because he entered it knowingly and voluntarily as 
required by the statute. See State v. Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Utah 2000) (holding that a trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea where 
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally pleaded guilty). 
II THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION BECAUSE HIS 
CHANGE OF MIND DOES NOT AMOUNT TO GOOD CAUSE TO WITHDRAW 
HIS PLEA. 
Under the old Utah Code section 77-13-6, a defendant was allowed to request leave to 
withdraw a guilty plea for ugood cause." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (2002)(amended May 
2003); State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Under this provision, a 
withdrawal of a guilty plea was a "privilege, not a right. . . [and was] within the sound discretion 
of the trial court." Gamblin, 1 P.3d at 1111 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 
(Utah 1987)). While the good cause standard no longer defines the grounds of a motion to 
withdraw a plea under current law, if it did apply, Defendant's motion would still fail. 
A defendant is required to have good cause to withdraw a guilty plea to avoid a potential 
manipulation of the criminal justice system. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged 
that allowing a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea before a court decides whether to accept the 
agreement "would degrade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a 
move in a game of chess." United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997). The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated: 
Were withdrawal automatic in every case where the defendant decided to alter his 
tactics and present his theory of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become 
a mere gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the 
defendant's whim. In fact, however, a guilty plea is no such trifle, but "a grave 
and solemn act," which is "accepted only with care and discernment." 
? 
r\ rs 
United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(quoting Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
A defendant's change of mind does not amount to "good cause" under the old statute. In 
State v. Larson, the Supreme Court of Utah held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. 560 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1977). 
The defendant claimed that he did not have the mental state necessary to commit the crime of 
possession of marijuana. Id. at 336. He did not allege that his counsel was ineffective or that his 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. Id. The trial court judge denied the defendant's motion 
because he found the plea was entered "freely and voluntarily, and without coercion, promises or 
threats of whatever nature . . . intentionally, and . . . with full and complete understanding of the 
consequences." Id. 
Other courts agree that a defendant's change of mind does not amount to good cause to 
withdraw a guilty plea. See Williams v. State, 421 P.2d 194, 197 (Kan. 1966)(rejecting 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea for "nothing more than a change of mind"); see 
also People v. DiGuglielmo, 33 P.3d 1248, 1250 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)(holding that trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
because "defendant had simply changed his mind about the disposition to which he had agreed"). 
Defendant does not allege that he entered his plea involuntarily or unknowingly. See 
Thorup, 841 P.2d at 748 (stating that an involuntary plea is good cause). He does not allege that 
he has discovered new evidence or that the prosecution's evidence has changed for the worse. 
See State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1987)(holding that the trial court abused its 
discretion in not allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after the prosecution's 
n J 
witness recanted her preliminary hearing testimony). 
Although he alludes to it, he does not specifically allege that he was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
a defendant must satisfy the two prong test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 
(1984). "Defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of this test." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). The first prong requires a defendant show that counsel's performance was 
"deficient", in the sense that counsel made errors serious enough to prejudice the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The second prong requires a defendant show 
that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186-87. 
Defendant has failed to point to anything specific about why his attorney "did not 
perform to the best of his abilities." Defendant asks this Court to indulge in speculation as to 
how Defense counsel's actions were prejudicial. However, courts should not entertain such 
conclusory and speculative arguments. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) 
("Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be 
demonstrable reality."). Thus, because Defendant only alleges his attorney was not at the "best 
of his abilities," and fails to point out any particular reason his counsel was "ineffective," this 
Court should deny his motion. 
Furthermore, Defendant's reasons for withdrawing his plea do not resemble any of the 
cases where the appellate courts have found good cause. Defendant simply has a case of 
"buyer's remorse," which is not good cause to withdraw his guilty plea. See Summers v. Cook, 
759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(fc"Buyer's remorse' about guilty pleas has resulted in 
numerous and varied efforts by convicted defendants to escape the result of their pleas."). 
4 
Defendant is seeking to escape the results of his knowing and intentional decision to plead guilty. 
He does not have good cause to withdraw his plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. He does not have good cause for 
withdrawing his guilty plea simply because he changed his mind. 
THEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny the Defendant's 
Motion to withdraw his plea. 
DATED this \l ' day of March 2005 
BRANDEN B. MILES 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE "OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041905772 FS 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Date: March 17, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbiel 
Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY 
Prosecutor: BRANDEN B MILES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 23, 1981 
CAT/CIC 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/27/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present m custody 
with Utah State Prison and is represented by Roy Cole. Court 
reporter, Tracy Covington, is present. Defendant has filed a motion 
to withdraw his plea of guilty. State filed an objection. 
Court denies the motion to withdraw his plea of guilty as there is 
not sufficient grounds to allow the withdrawal. Court proceeds with 
sentencing. 
Page 1 
Case No: 041905772 
Date: Mar 17, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends a consecutive sentence to any other charge. Court 
orders $1,333.73 restitution on behalf of Crime Reparations and 
$30.00 on behalf of Travis Mendoza to be collected by the 
Department of Corrections. 
Dated this J2 1> day of "/'?1C<- \, t L * /~2of 
WLEYRTBALP PAR Y . BA DWIN 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM G 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of ' - ' i J i J J J 'Jlji.KI 
WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner tujj ,„ , , -"] ,-' \,\ bS 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 ;$ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON, ) Case No. 041905772 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant, Bryan Allen Person, by and through his 
attorney, Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal the order 
denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea together with the judgment, sentence and 
conviction that was entered hereon in the above-entitled case on or about the 23rd day of 
March, 2005, to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this / day of April, 2003. 
fee O, J2—M. A-L-
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Notice of Appeal to: 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 £300 8,6* Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
postage prepaid, on this _/ day of April, 2Q05. , , 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM H 
2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE CLERK: State of Utah versus Bryan Person. This 
is set for sentencing, case number 041905772. 
THE COURT: Mr. Person is present. This is the time 
set for sentencing. The Court has received from the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department a presentence report as well 
as a recommendation. 
Before the Court also is a motion that has been made by 
Mr. Cole from the public defenders office, a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty. To that Mr. Miles filed a state's 
response to that motion to withdraw. I also should note that 
the record is now, in this case, being maintained by the 
court reporter. Any other recordings are merely for my 
notes. 
With that, does the state want to be heard -- or let's 
clarify, Mr. Cole, where you're at now as far as the motion. 
MR. COLE: He still wishes to withdraw his plea, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Do you want to make any 
further argument than that's been submitted? 
MR. COLE: I don't. 
MR. MILES: We'll submit on the motion. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Based upon the submissions that I have, the Court has 
looked at the process by which this was brought by before the 
3 
Court, Mr. Person. It is not sufficient to claim that your 
attorney did not perform to the best of his abilities and you 
felt rushed. You and I had a discussion about this case, I 
went through what your rights were in great detail and we 
talked about that over and over talked about it. And in 
addition to that, there were things placed in writing and I 
find that there are no grounds sufficient for me to grant the 
motion, and therefore, I deny the motion to set aside your 
plea. 
Now, does the state want to be heard on the sentencing? 
MR. MILES: The state has agreed to remain silent, 
your Honor. Is the victim here, Mr. Montoya? 
THE COURT: Is Mr. Montoya present? 
MR. COLE: You mean Mendoza? No, Travis is custody 
actually. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, he' s in jail. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Cole? 
MR. COLE: Obviously he's not been happy with the 
recommendation of consecutive, he'd ask that it be concurrent 
with what he's doing now at the state prison and he'd ask 
that that's what be imposed. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cole. The Court after 
reviewing this imposes the following sentence: 
I'm sentencing you to zero to five years in the Utah --
or five years to life in the Utah State Prison. That time is 
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to run consecutive. I can find no reason to run this 
concurrent with the time that you have that you're now 
serving under the -- well, there is just no reason for me to 
run it concurrent, this was done while you were out on the 
other case and that's all. 
MR. MILES: Any restitution, your Honor? 
MR. COLE: Apparently Mr. Bushell has one he wants 
to play through on. 
THE CLERK: He's not done. 
THE COURT: Let's see, let's talk about the 
restitution. 
ADULT PROBATION: $1,333.73. It's on the front page 
of the report, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Right. And then there is a -- then 
there is also a $30 -- that $1,333.73 is to the Crime 
Reparations Fund and then there is a $30 restitution to 
Travis Mendoza. That's all. 
THE DEFENDANT: I can't -- that's it? 
THE COURT: Yes, we're finished. 
(The matter concluded.) 
ADDENDUM I 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE CLERK: State of Utah versus Bryan Person, 
041905772. This is the time set for pretrial, on page 10. 
We do have a court reporter. 
THE COURT: Yes, we do. 
THE CLERK: She's sitting there quietly. I didn't 
know if you knew she was over there, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Person is present. This is the time 
set for pretrial. We do have a court reporter who is here. 
Thank you for being here. 
And the record will be maintained by the court reporter. 
Any other recording now will be for purposes of my notes 
only. 
With that, Mr. Cole, how are we going to proceed in this 
case? 
MR. COLE: Your Honor, I think we may have a 
resolution, with the Court's approval. What we would propose 
is that Mr. Person plead guilty to Count 1 as charged. 
Upon -- upon that plea, the State would then dismiss Count 2 . 
The State has agreed to submit on its presentence report 
and agrees not to take any activity to refer the case 
federally, which, of course, doesn't mean if the feds find 
out about it on their own, they can't prosecute, but the 
State just isn't going to refer it over there. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
(801) 395-1055 
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Mr. Miles? 
MR. MILES: That is the State's agreement, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Person, do you understand what's being represented 
to me this morning? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You — there is a statement — a 
written Statement in Advance of Plea. Have you been through 
that document thoroughly? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Would you like to sign that now in my 
presence, please? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I will. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Person, let's talk about this 
for just a minute, okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head.) 
THE COURT: To begin with, you've been represented 
by the public defender throughout this process. Are you 
satisfied with the legal representation you've received? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: Okay. This document is the one we 
talked about and that appears to be your signature. Is that, 
in fact, your signature on this document? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
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THE COURT: And this — by way of that, you — tells 
me that you understand all of the conditions of your — of 
the Constitution as it applies to rights that you have. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You understand those rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Let's talk about them for a minute, 
Mr. Person. You, first of all, understand that you have a 
right to continue your plea of not guilty. This case is set 
for trial starting on February 7th, in a couple of weeks. 
You'd have a right to go forward with that trial. If that 
didn't work, we'd set another trial date. But you — you 
understand the right you have to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: At that trial, it would be held here in 
this courtroom. The State would call witnesses and ask them 
questions, and then your attorney could cross-examine those 
witnesses. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: If you had witnesses that you wanted 
here, the Court would subpoena them and require them to be 
here. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: If we had this trial, you would not 
to testify against yourself. No one could require that. 
have 
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you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You have a presumption of innocence. 
The State would have to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt before you could be convicted. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: There would be eight members of the 
jury, all would have to agree that you were guilty in order 
to be found guilty. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: And if you're found guilty, you could 
appeal that conviction. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, if you enter a plea of 
guilty, you're giving up that right. No witnesses will be 
called; you'll — you'll be admitting to this crime. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
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THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs 
or alcohol today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Receiving any kind of mental health 
treatment? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Are there any questions you'd like to 
ask myself or Mr. Cole before we proceed? 
THE DEFENDANT: After we're done with this, I 
would — would it be — would you let me turn around to tell 
my girlfriend I love her and I — 
THE COURT: We'll talk about that in a moment. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: What is the factual basis? 
MR. MILES: Your Honor, on October 13th of last 
year, the defendant met the victim and requested a ride to 
the mouth of Ogden Canyon near the waterfalls. The victim 
gave him a ride. The defendant indicated he was looking for 
a lost ring. 
When they got out of the car and began to search for the 
ring and got 
pulled out a 
received the 
some distance away from 
gun and demanded the vi 
victim1 
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The victim, during this, thinking I guess he was about 
to be shot, reached up and attempted to grab the gun. He and 
the defendant struggled. The gun discharged, striking the 
victim in the left forearm, I believe. 
The defendant then ran from the scene and got in the 
victim's car, took the car, and sped off where he was located 
a short distance away by officers. He led the officers on a 
short chase, crashed the car, got out and fled from the 
vehicle where the officers chased him and eventually 
apprehended him a short distance after that. 
They found him in possession of the victim1s wallet. 
The gun which he used was found disposed of in a garbage can 
at a residence nearby. 
THE COURT: Is that what happened? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
The Court will accept those facts as being sufficient to 
accept the plea of guilty. 
Now, you understand that those -- what would have to be 
proved would be that you unlawfully and intentionally took 
possession of property from another against his will by 
reasons of force and use of a dangerous weapon, causing 
injury to another. Those would have to be proved. You 
understand that they would have to prove that case. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
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THE COURT: And you're pleading guilty to it so they 
won't have to prove that. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Now, again, I've been through your 
rights with you. Is it still your desire to plead guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: To the charge of Count 1, a first degree 
felony, aggravated robbery, are you guilty or not guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The Court accepts the plea 
of guilty, finds that you've made it knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
You have up until the time of sentencing that you can 
make a motion to have your plea withdrawn. After sentencing, 
you would give up that right. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You have a right to be sentenced in not 
less than two nor more than 45 days. We'll set a date for 
sentencing. We can do this on the -- I think she used the 
3rd of March. Is that — 
MR. COLE: She actually said the 17th. 
MR. MILES: 17th of March, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 17th of March. That's fine. 
Now, we have an officer here that you're in custody 
with. 
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